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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two chapters that examine the optimality of delaying
quality tests of new products and the e↵ects of cancellation payments on the hold-up
problem.
Chapter 1 analyzes the possibility of delaying quality testing of a new product
when the market consists of an early adopter and a follower who receive some private
information about the quality. In our social learning framework, delaying a test
can lead to better informed decisions regarding conducting the test by the regulator
because she, along with other market participants, gains more information about the
product quality by observing early adopter’s informative actions. Our results suggest
that waiting can be optimal when testing costs are not extremely high or low, and
when ex ante there is high probability that both consumers will buy a high quality
product and abstain from buying a low quality product. However, once the opposite
action by the early adopter is observed (e.g. buying what is likely to be a low quality
product), this increases the probability of the follower taking the same action. This
can result in high expected losses, and delaying the test becomes no longer optimal.
It should be conducted in order to correct the follower’s course of action.
Chapter 2 examines the e↵ects of various levels of a fixed cancellation payment
in a cost-plus type contract on the hold-up problem. The case of high cancellation
payment that results in the agent making inefficiently high investment is referred to
as the reverse hold-up problem and is of main interest. We also derive the levels
of cancellation payment for which optimal level of investment by the agent can be

v

induced and for which a standard hold-up problem arises. We report the results of
the laboratory experiment designed to test our theoretical predictions. We find that,
in general, participants follow the equilibrium strategy, and when the cancellation
payment is set sufficiently high, the principal is held up by the agent most of the time.
We find no evidence of fairness concerns that could explain participants’ choices.
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Chapter 1
Now, Tomorrow, or Never: The
Optimality of Delaying Quality
Tests
1.1

Introduction

When a new product is developed, it often has to go through quality and safety
inspections prior to being introduced to the market. The government uses regulatory
interventions and agencies such as the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
to control quality and safety of various products like food, drugs, appliances, and
devices. Such regulations can be associated with high costs of conducting them. Since
the 1980s, the government has been trying to improve the e↵ectiveness of regulations
regarding food safety in order to reduce budget costs of government programs and to
improve their efficiency (Jacobs, 1997). In some cases, however, the quality control
is not performed until after a new product is introduced to the market. For example,
in 2009 the FDA required formal approval of intranasal Zicam products due to long

1

lasting or sometimes even permanent loss of smell associated with its use after more
than a hundred consumer reports1 .
This paper studies the optimality of delaying quality testing of a new product of
unknown quality in the market where consumers receive private imperfect information
about its true quality. Delaying testing allows for additional information about the
quality of the product to penetrate the market through early customers’ informative
decisions. By observing these decisions and inferring customers’ private information,
the regulator, who wants to maximize social welfare, is able to improve her estimate
regarding the product’s true quality and about later customers’ behavior. Thus, our
model allows not only the customers, but the regulator to learn from observing the
consumers’ actions when quality testing is delayed. As a result, she is able to make
better informed decisions, and social welfare can be increased.
We explore the possibility of social learning when information becomes available
on the market. Much of previous work that utilized social learning setting has focused
on strategic firm’s decisions that a↵ect information transfers and social learning by
future customers in order to maximize profits (Gill and Sgroi (2012), Liu and Schiraldi
(2012), Gill and Sgroi (2008), Bose et al. (2006, 2008)). The only study we are aware
of that considers the e↵ects of a particular strategy on social welfare is paper by Sgroi
(2002) which analyzes the consequences of forcing a subset of players to take actions
before everybody else does. Our research is similar in a sense that optimal waiting
allows for social learning. However, unlike their study, the social planner does not
undertake any costly actions to enhance social learning in our paper.
We analyze a simple model of quality testing of the producer of a good with
two groups of buyers (early adopters and followers2 ) who learn from each other’s
1

http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31388177/ns/health-cold_and_flu/t/
nasal-spray-can-cause-loss-smell-fda-warns
2
Two groups of consumers, leaders and followers, are considered in the model by Kircher and
Postlewaite (2008). In their study, leaders emerge endogenously and their role is enhanced by the
firms rewarding them with better service. The rest of the consumers are less knowledgeable and
learn from observing the leaders’ choices. In our paper, the group of leaders is given exogenously.
Also, to simplify the analysis, we normalize the size of each group of consumers to one. Another
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decisions. To simplify the analysis, we normalize the size of each group to one. The
quality of the good is unknown to the buyers and the regulator3 and can be either high
or low. The buyers are Bayesian decision makers who take actions under incomplete
and asymmetric information. Each decision maker’s information set consists of some
common prior belief about the true quality, her private signal, and the observed
actions of the early adopters in the case when a decision maker is a follower. We
assume that there are two time periods in the model. Thus, delaying a test implies
conducting it only after observing certain early adopter’s purchasing decisions. It is
assumed that regulation fully reveals the true quality.
Delayed testing can be welfare enhancing by allowing to incur high testing costs
only when there is a need for it. Observing the early adopter’s purchasing decision
provides additional information to the follower about the quality of the good. It
increases her probability to buy it when the early adopter buys which is the optimal
course of action when the product is of high quality. Similarly, after observing the
early adopter abstaining from buying the good, the follower is more likely to abstain
as well, which is optimal when the good is of low quality. In both cases, there is no
need for testing, and costs associated with it can be avoided. On the other hand, after
seeing the first consumer buying (not buying) what is more likely to be a low (high)
quality product, the follower will do the same either with some positive probability
or always. The social planner should intervene and correct the follower’s actions by
revealing the true quality.
The economic research on quality and safety control concentrates a lot on methods
to measure costs and benefits related to safety issues (Antle (1999), Kolstad et al.
(1990), Hammitt (2005)). Several papers study factors that a↵ect product quality
levels. Hamilton et al. (2003) develop a model that explains how public support
for product quality regulations depends on preferences for private and public goods.
di↵erence form Kircher and Postlewaite (2008) is that we analyze the optimal actions by the social
planner rather than firms.
3
We abstract away from a firm’s ability to convey information about the quality of its products
by developing reputation (Shapiro (1983)).
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Marette et al. (2000) consider specific policy instruments (minimum safety standards,
labeling, etc.) and show that they have di↵erent e↵ects on the safety of the products
supplied on the market and on the overall welfare, depending on the information
structure. Our paper concentrates on the optimal timing of quality control among
other aspects of quality regulation.
This paper is also related to the literature on audit mechanisms and firms’
compliance. Among recent studies, Liu and Neilson (2009) analyze the dynamic audit
mechanism with fixed enforcement budget and conclude that it makes leverage e↵ect
more prominent by evoking tournaments among firms. Gilpatric et al. (2011) develop
two models of endogenous audit in which the regulator evaluates firms’ relative
compliance levels in order to select some of them for audit. One model assumes firms
selection based on rank with regulator’s auditing resources being fixed and commonly
known. The second model is more general as it assumes that probability of being
audited depends on how a firm’s compliance compares to the average compliance of
the peers. In this case, the audit capacity is not fixed meaning it is not known to
the firms. Our paper explores the possibility of delayed regulation in the absence
of budget constraints. We expect that having a limited budget would reinforce the
finding that waiting may be optimal.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides the model setup. Section
1.3 considers an optimistic case and provides the conditions under which the set
of testing costs exists such that delaying a test is optimal. Section 1.4 analyzes a
pessimistic case and establishes the conditions under which there is a set of testing
costs for which delaying a test is the best choice. Section 1.5 o↵ers some conclusions.

1.2

Model

Consider two groups of risk-neutral buyers: early adopters and followers.

For

simplicity of the analysis, we are going to assume that each group consists of one
representative consumer i = 1, 2. Each consumer makes a binary action choice every
4

time period whether to purchase a good of unknown quality which corresponds to
action B, or not purchase which corresponds to action N B. The number of periods
is 2, let t 2 [1, 2] denote the time period. The quality of the good is unknown to the
buyers, however, it is commonly known to be of high quality (QH ) with probability
↵, or low quality (QL ) with probability 1

↵.

We follow Gill and Sgroi (2012) by assuming that the good is produced by a
monopolist who knows its true quality, but is not able to verifiably deliver this
information to the consumers since a low-quality monopolist can costlessly mimic
a high-quality monopolist. The price of the good of unknown quality is P 4 and
VH > P > VL , where VH is the value of high quality good, VL is the value of low
quality good. We assume that price is fixed because the time periods are sufficiently
short and it is too costly to change the price often. Consumption is more rewarding
when the good is of high quality, while not purchasing is better when it is of low
quality. The payo↵s are given by M (B|QH ) = VH

P , M (B|QL ) = VL

P,

M (N B|QH ) = M (N B|QL ) = 0. Without loss of generality we will normalize the
values:
VH
VH
and redefine the price as p =
M (B|QH ) = 1

VL
P
>
VL
VH
P VL
.
VH VL

p, M (B|QL ) =

VL
VL
>
VL
VH

VL
,
VL

Then 1 > p > 0, and the payo↵s become

p. If no other information was available to the

consumers, then buying would be optimal when ↵ > p.
We assume that each buyer i receives a private informative signal about the quality
of the good. Private signals are independent conditional on the true quality of the
product. The signal can be high (sH ) or low (sL ), with the high signal being observed
with probability

when the product is of high quality, and with probability 1

otherwise, i.e. P (sH |QH ) = P (sL |QL ) = , and P (sH |QL ) = P (sL |QH ) = 1
where

> 12 . The private signal is assumed to be imperfect, i.e.

4

,

< 1.

Bikhchandani, et al. (1992), Gill and Sgroi (2008), Liu and Schiraldi (2012), Sgroi (2002) assume
fixed cost of adoption of a new product.
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There is a regulator in the model who can perform a quality testing of the producer
of the good at fixed cost c. It is assumed that the quality testing can perfectly reveal
the true quality of the product. For example, if it is conducted before anybody has
made a decision, then the true quality of the product is revealed to both buyers and
they buy only if the quality is QH . Testing prevents two purchasing decisions when
the true quality of the good is low or it induces purchasing decisions when the true
quality of the good is high. The regulator has to choose an optimal rule, i.e. she has
to decide whether to test before anybody has made a decision at t = 0, at t = 1, or
never test.
Given the above notation, we can define the early adopter’s posterior beliefs about
the true quality of the good after receiving a high or a low signal:
↵

P r(QH |sH ) =

↵ + (1

P r(QH |sL ) =

↵(1
)
.
↵(1
) + (1 ↵)

↵)(1

)

,

The signal of the early adopter is not observable by the follower, however, she
can perfectly observe the early adopter’s purchasing decision. When the product
price is not extremely high or low, the early adopter makes a decision based entirely
on her signal, thus the follower can infer the signal from the observed action of the
predecessor. The follower’s posterior beliefs about the true quality of the good after
receiving a high or a low signal given the early adopter’s signal are

P r(QH |sH , sH ) =

↵
2

↵

P r(QH |sH , sL ) = P r(QH |sL , sH ) =

6

+ (1

↵ (1

2

↵)(1

↵ (1
) + (1

)2

,

)
↵) (1

)

= ↵,

P r(QH |sL , sL ) =

↵(1

↵(1
)2
)2 + (1 ↵)

2

.

A consumer will buy the product if her expected payo↵ from it is positive. If
we denote the posterior probability that the product is of high quality after a given
signal or a sequence of signals as µ, then a consumer’s purchasing decision is defined
by

µ > p.
A consumer’s purchasing decision depends not only on her private signal, but also
on the price of the product. However, when the price is extremely high or low, the
signal becomes irrelevant to the consumer’s decision, and she either always buys the
product or always abstains from buying. This holds for both the early adopter and
the follower. Such actions carry no information, and the regulator will not gain better
knowledge about the quality by observing them. Thus delaying the test in this case
is never optimal.
By considering all possible signals observed by both consumers we obtain four
cases which are going to be characterized below (see Appendix ). Signals matter for
the consumers’ decisions when the price is not extreme. The early adopter makes her
purchasing decision based on her private signal. It is also the case for the follower
when her private signal coincides with that of the early adopter. When there are two
contradicting signals, the follower may or may not buy the product. We call the case
optimistic if she does, and we call it pessimistic otherwise.
Case 1. When the product’s price p is less than

↵(1

↵(1 )
)+(1 ↵)

, the first consumer

will buy the product even if her signal is sL . The second consumer is not able to
obtain any additional information from such action. She finds herself in the position
of the first consumer, thus her decision will be based entirely on her own signal. She
will purchase the product even if her signal is sL .
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Case 2. When p belongs to [ ↵(1

↵(1 )
)+(1 ↵)

, ↵], the first consumer follows her signal.

The second consumer buys when both signals are sH or when her signal contradicts
the signal of the first consumer, and she abstains from buying if both consumers
receive sL . We will refer to Case 2 as the optimistic case.
Case 3. When p belongs to (↵, ↵

↵
+(1 ↵)(1

)

], the first consumer follows her signal.

The second consumer buys when both consumers receive sH , and she abstains from
buying when signals are contradicting or when both signals are sL . We will refer to
Case 3 as the pessimistic case.
Case 4. When p is greater than

↵
↵ +(1 ↵)(1

)

, the first consumer abstains from

buying even if her signal is sH . Similar to Case 1, the second consumer is not receiving
any new information by observing such action, and she will make her decision based
only on her private signal. She will abstain from buying even if her signal is sH .
We are going to analyze optimistic and pessimistic cases. In both cases, the
regulator has the following options of when to test the good: before the early adopter
has made a decision at t = 0, after the early adopter has bought it, after the early
adopter has abstained from buying, or never test.
For cases 2 and 3 we are going to establish the conditions under which delayed
testing is optimal. Cases 1 and 4 are trivial since the regulator’s decision options
reduce to either testing at t = 0 or never5 .

1.3

Optimistic Case

We first consider the optimistic case which is defined by the follower’s decision to
purchase the good if the signals received by the early adopter and the follower
are opposite. We define the expected payo↵s from four decision options that the
regulator has. The notation is as follows: OP t=0 is the total expected payo↵ resulting
5

The regulator’s choice will be determined by the level of cost c. In Case 1, testing is better than
no testing if c  2(1 ↵)p, or when the cost of testing is no greater than the expected loss resulting
from purchases of a low quality good. In Case 4, it has to be that c  2↵(1 p) for the testing to
be optimal, or when testing cost is no greater than the expected gain that could have been obtained
if a high quality good was purchased.
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from testing prior to the early adopter’s decision, OP 1B is the total expected payo↵
resulting from testing conditional on the early adopter decision to buy, OP 1N B is the
total expected payo↵ resulting from testing conditional on the early adopter decision
to not buy, and OP N o is the total expected payo↵ when there is no test performed.
OP t=0 ⌘ 2↵(1

p) c,
⇥
⇤
⇥
⇤ ⇥
2
2
OP 1B ⌘ ↵(1 p) 3
(1 ↵)p 1
↵ + (1 ↵)(1
⇥
⇤
⇥
⇤ ⇥
OP 1N B ⌘ ↵(1 p) 1 +
(1 ↵)p 2 2
↵(1
) + (1 ↵)
⇥
⇤
⇥
⇤
2
2
OP N o ⌘ ↵(1 p) 3
(1 ↵)p 2
,

1.3.1

⇤
) c,
⇤
c,

Testing After the Early Adopter Buys

In this section we derive the conditions under which the regulator performs a test
if and only if the early adopter buys the product. We start with establishing the
threshold levels of testing costs for which performing a test after the early adopter’s
decision to buy dominates testing before anybody has made their decisions or never
testing. We denote these threshold levels c1B and c̄1B respectively6 :
c1B =

(1

⇥
) ↵(2
c̄1B =

where Y ⌘ ↵ +

)(1

(1

p) + (1
Y

↵)(1 + )p

⇤

,

)(1 ↵)p
,
1 Y

2↵ and Y 2 (0, 1). Thus, delaying a test until the first consumer

buys dominates testing at t = 0 when the cost is sufficiently high c > c1B , and
it dominates no testing when the cost is sufficiently low c < c̄1B . Note that when
c1B

c̄1B , delayed testing is dominated by the other two options: testing at t = 0 or

never. Proposition 1.1 provides the conditions under which c1B < c̄1B .
6

c1B is derived by setting OP t=0 = OP 1B , c̄1B is derived by setting OP N o = OP 1B
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Proposition 1.1. There exists a range of costs (c1B , c̄1B ) for which testing after the
early adopter buys is optimal in the optimistic case when the following conditions are
satisfied:
p 2 (p⇤1B , ↵],
where p⇤1B =

(1

(1.1)

↵(2
)(1
↵)Y + (3↵
↵<

3
4

Y)
1)(1

Y)

,

(1.2)

4
,
8

(1.3)

> 0.75.

(1.4)

Proof. We first are going to derive the condition on price for which the range of costs
(c1B , c̄1B ) exists. It has to be that c1B < c̄1B , or
(1

⇥
) ↵(2

)(1

p) + (1
Y

↵)(1 + )p

⇤

<

(1

)(1 ↵)p
,
1 Y

which holds when p > p⇤1B .
Since the optimistic case is defined by the range of prices [ ↵(1

↵(1 )
)+(1 ↵)

, ↵], it

has to be the case that p⇤1B is smaller than the upper bound ↵. This holds when
↵<

3 4
4 8

when

. Since ↵ 2 (0, 1), there exists a value of ↵ that satisfies the latter inequality

> 34 .

Also, p⇤1B is greater than the lower bound

↵(1

↵(1 )
)+(1 ↵)

7

, and thus p > p⇤1B is

binding condition on price.
We now are going to show that for c 2 (c1B , c̄1B ) the regulator performs a test if

and only if the first consumer buys the product. It has to be that OP 1B > OP 1N B

for testing after the first consumer’s decision to buy to be the optimal strategy. This
holds when
c>
)
> ↵(1 ↵(1
)+(1 ↵) for ↵ >
the latter inequality is negative.
7 ⇤
p1B

(1
(2

)2 (p ↵)
(⌘ c0 ).
1)(2↵ 1)

2 3 +3 2 1
(1 2 )(2 2
2)

(1.5)

which always holds because the right-hand side of
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Note that c0 < c1B when
p>

(1

↵(2
)(2Y 1)
)Y + (2Y 1)↵(2

↵(1
)Y
,
) (1 ↵)(1 + )

(1.6)

which is always satisfied because the right-hand side of (1.6) is less than zero when
conditions (1.3) and (1.4) hold. Also note that according to condition (1.1), p >
p⇤1B > 0. Thus, when (c1B , c̄1B ) exists and c is belongs to that range, condition (1.5)
is satisfied and testing after the first consumer has bought is the best strategy.

Having the price set high enough in accordance with condition (1.1) will justify
any testing cost in the range (c1B , c̄1B ) since the expected not loss from delayed
testing is given by (1

↵)(1

)p and is increasing in p. Conditions (1.3) and (1.4)

imply that waiting for the first B decision is optimal if the precision of the buyers’
signals is sufficiently high and the probability that the true quality of the good is
QH is low. This implies that ex ante probability that the buyers will abstain from
buying potentially low quality good is high. The expected losses are low in this case.
This explains why the regulator prefers to wait for the early adopter to act instead
of testing the good at t = 0. However, once the early adopter has purchased, the
follower will update her beliefs given that choice, and ex post it is certain in this
optimistic case that she will also buy potentially low quality good. The expected
losses increase. This induces the regulator to step in and choose delayed testing over
no testing in order to avoid high expected losses.

1.3.2

Testing After the Early Adopter Does Not Buy

In this section we derive the conditions under which the regulator conducts a test in
the optimistic case if and only if the early adopter abstains from buying the product.
As in previous subsection, we start with establishing the the threshold levels of testing
costs for which a test after the first consumer’s decision to abstain dominates a test
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before she has made her decision or no test at all. We use c1N B and c̄1N B to denote
these two levels respectively:

c1N B =

c̄1N B =

⇥
) ↵(1

(1

⇥
) ↵(1

(1

p) + 2(1
1 Y
)(1
Y

p) + (1

↵)p

⇤

,

↵) p

⇤

.

The threshold levels determine three ranges of testing costs such that for c > c1N B
waiting until the early adopter has abstained to test is better than testing at t = 0,
and for c < c̄1N B such waiting is preferred over no test. Proposition 1.2 provides
the conditions under which the range of costs exists for which waiting for the first
consumer’s decision to not buy is optimal in the optimistic case.
Proposition 1.2. There exists a range of costs (c1N B , c̄1N B ) for which testing after
the early adopter has abstained from buying is optimal in the optimistic case when
one of two sets of conditions in Table 1.1 is satisfied.

Table 1.1 Conditions for Proposition 1.2.
Condition on p

Condition on ↵
↵ 2 ( 14

p 2 (p⇤1N B , ↵]
p 2 [ ↵(1

↵(1 )
)+(1 ↵)

, ↵]

where p⇤1N B =

↵

⇥
↵ Y

(1

4
8

, (1

Condition on

2 (2
3)
)
2 )( 2 2 + +2)
2 (2

(1 2 )( 2

3)
2+

+2)

⇥
⇤
↵ Y (1
)(1 Y )
⇤
⇥
)(1 Y ) + (1 ↵) (1

12

> 0.75
> 14 ( 1 +

Y)

2Y

⇤.

p

17)

(1.7)

Proof. We first are going to derive the condition on price for which the range of costs
(c1N B , c̄1N B ) exists. It has to be that c1N B < c̄1N B , or
⇥
) ↵(1

(1

p) + 2(1
1 Y

↵)p

⇤

<

(1

⇥
) ↵(1

)(1
Y

p) + (1

↵) p

⇤

,

which holds for p > p⇤1N B .
Prices that satisfy the condition p > p⇤1N B have to be in the range of
[ ↵(1

↵(1 )
)+(1 ↵)

, ↵] for the optimistic case. If p⇤1N B is greater than the upper bound,

then no value of price exists in the optimistic scenario for which c1N B < c̄1N B . Thus,
p⇤1N B has to be smaller than the upper bound ↵, which holds when
↵>

1
4

4
.
8

(1.8)

Since ↵ 2 (0, 1), there exists a value of ↵ which satisfies condition (1.8) when
Whether the lower bound

↵(1

↵(1 )
)+(1 ↵)

> 0.75.

or p⇤1N B is greater depends on the level

of prior probability ↵. In particular, the value of p⇤1N B is greater and condition
p > p⇤1N B is binding when ↵ <

2 (2
3)
8
.
(1 2 )( 2 2 + +2)

Latter condition on ↵ together with

condition (1.8) limit the range of values that ↵ can take, and together with price
range and condition on

establish the first set of conditions for the range of costs

(c1N B , c̄1N B ) to exist.
The lower bound

↵(1

↵(1 )
)+(1 ↵)

becomes binding when ↵ >

2 (2
3)
.
(1 2 )( 2 2 + +2)

This

condition on ↵ is stricter than condition (1.8), and it can be satisfied only when is
p
greater than 14 ( 1 + 17)9 . This results in the second set of conditions for the range
of costs (c1N B , c̄1N B ) to exist.
We now are going to show that for c 2 (c1N B , c̄1N B ) the regulator performs a
test if and only if the first consumer does not buy the product. It has to be that
OP 1N B > OP 1B for testing after the early adopter has abstained to be the optimal
8

Note, that

9

When



2
(2
3)
1 4
> 0.75.
(1 2 )( 2 2 + +2) > 4 8 for
p
1
17), the condition on ↵ is not
4( 1 +
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satisfied because

2
(2
3)
(1 2 )( 2 2 + +2)

1.

strategy. This holds when
c > c0 .

(1.9)

Note that p  ↵ since this is the optimistic case, thus the numerator of c0 is
no greater than zero. Also, ↵ >

1 4
4 8

> 12 , thus the denominator of c0 is positive.

Condition (1.9) holds for any c, and testing after the first customer’s decision to not
buy is the best strategy

According to the above results, endogenous testing after the early adopter has
abstained from buying the good is an optimal strategy when price is high enough,
however, Proposition 1.2 allows for a larger range of prices compared to the case of
testing after the first consumer’s buying decision. Intuitively, testing after first NB
decision not only allows to avoid the expected loss of (1

↵) (1

)p resulting from

buying a low quality good, but also generates the expected gain of ↵(1

)2 (1

p)

from buying a high quality good which otherwise would not be purchased because of
two consecutive low signals. The expected gain is decreasing in price, and the avoided
loss is increasing in price. For higher values of prior probability ↵, the e↵ect of gain
may dominate and lower values of price may be optimal. Thus, a greater range of
possible values of p is justified.
The signal has to be precise enough and the prior probability has to be sufficiently
high for the delayed test after the early adopter has abstained to be preferred. Ex
ante the expected losses resulting from not testing are low since a high signal will be
received with high probability when the product is good. The early adopter is more
likely to buy it. However, after she receives a low signal and does not buy the good,
the regulator tries to avoid ex post high losses to the follower which come from not
gaining the benefit of buying in the good state after observing a low signal, and from
a buying decision in the bad state after observing a high signal.
Propositions 1.1 and 1.2 establish the conditions under which there exist two
ranges of costs such that delayed quality testing is optimal. However, these two ranges
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cannot exist simultaneously because the conditions in Proposition 1.1 and Proposition
1.2 are mutually exclusive. Only one of the two strategies can be optimal at a time.
In particular, we consider two conditions on ↵: condition (1.3) from Proposition 1.1
and the less strict condition on the lower bound of ↵ from Proposition 1.2:
↵<
where

3 4
4 8

<

1 4
4 8

for

3
4

4
8

↵>

1
4

4
,
8

> 0.75. If, for example, the value of ↵ satisfies condition

(1.3), then it may be optimal to wait for the first purchasing decision to conduct
quality testing, but it will never be optimal to conduct it if the first observed decision
was to abstain from buying. This can be explained by sufficiently low prior probability
that the product is of high quality and sufficiently precise consumer signals, which
together imply that NB is more likely to be a socially optimal decision, and in this
case no regulator’s intervention is needed after observing it.
Table 1.2 provides numerical examples which compare the welfare resulting from
all testing decisions by the regulator in the optimistic case for given parameter values.
Notice that when testing after the first consumer’s purchasing decision is optimal,
testing after the first abstaining decision results in the smallest total payo↵s. The
opposite holds for the case when testing after the first consumer has abstained is
optimal.

1.4

Pessimistic Case

We now turn to the discussion of the optimality of the delayed testing in the
pessimistic case. This case is determined by the follower’s decision to abstain from
buying the good of unknown quality when conflicting signals are received by the early
adopter and the follower. We start with defining the expected payo↵s resulting from
the regulator’s four testing decisions. P P is used to denote pessimistic payo↵ and the
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Table 1.2 Total expected payo↵s for given parameter values in the optimistic
scenario.
After 1B
0.78
Condition on ↵ ↵ < 0.054
↵

After 1NB
0.9

0.78

↵ < 0.188

↵ 2 (0.946, 1.001)

0.01

0.1

(0.0074, 0.01]

p

0.9
↵

0.949

0.99

0.99

(0.044, 0.1]

(0.973, 0.99]

(0.917, 0.99]

0.009

0.1

0.98

0.98

c

0.0079

0.033

0.0112

0.0044

c̄

0.0087

0.05

0.0117

0.01

c

0.008

0.04

0.0115

0.005

OP t=0

0.01182

0.140

0.0281

0.0346

OP N o

0.01171

0.144

0.0282

0.0345

OP 1B

0.01187

0.146

0.0215

0.0311

0.00752

0.120

0.0283

0.0351

Price range

OP 1N B

Note: The numbers in bold demonstrate the dominance of delayed testing over testing at t=0 and no testing at all
since the resulting total expected payo↵ is the highest.
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superscripts are defined the same way as in the optimistic case.
P P t=0 ⌘ 2↵(1

p)

P P 1B ⌘ 2↵(1

p)

c,

⇤
↵)(1
) c,
⇥
⇤
⇥
⇤ ⇥
P P 1N B ⌘ ↵(1 p) 1 + 2
(1 ↵)p 2 3 + 2
↵(1
) + (1
⇤
⇥
⇤
⇥
P P N o ⌘ ↵(1 p) + 2
(1 ↵)p 2 3 + 2 ,

1.4.1

⇥
↵)p 1

(1

⇤

⇥

↵ + (1

⇤
↵) c,

Testing After the Early Adopter Buys

Similar to the optimistic case, we derive the conditions under which the regulator
performs a test if and only if the early adopter buys the product. A test after the
early adopter has bought is optimal when the value of testing cost belongs to some
interval (s1B , s̄1B ), where :
s1B =

s̄1B =

(1

(1

⇥
) 2↵(1
⇥
) ↵ (1

p) + (1

↵)p

Y

p) + (1
1 Y

↵)(1

⇤

,

)p

⇤

.

Delaying the test until the first consumer buys in this pessimistic case dominates
testing at t = 0 when c > s1B , otherwise the test would be cheap enough to be
conducted early. Waiting dominates the option of no testing when c < s̄1B , otherwise
it becomes too costly to perform any tests. When s1B

s̄1B , delayed testing is

dominated by the other two strategies. Proposition 1.3 provides the conditions under
which s1B < s̄1B .
Proposition 1.3. There exists a range of costs (s1B , s̄1B ) for which testing after the
early adopter buys is optimal in pessimistic case when one of two sets of conditions
in Table 1.3 is satisfied:
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Table 1.3 Conditions for Proposition 1.3.
Condition on p

Condition on ↵
↵ 2 ( (1 22

p 2 (↵, p̃1B )
p 2 (↵, ↵

↵
+(1 ↵)(1

)

↵

]

where p̃1B =

(1

3

2

)( 2

3 +2
3 4
2 + +2) , 4 8

Condition on
)

> 0.75

2 3 2 3 +2
(1 2 )( 2 2 + +2)

↵(2(1 Y )
↵
)Y + (3↵

> 0.781

Y)
1)(1

Y)

.

(1.10)

Proof. See Appendix A.

Consumers with sufficiently precise signals are likely to avoid buying the product
which is likely to be bad. This justifies waiting by the regulator: if the early adopter
does not buy, the follower will abstain with certainty, and no testing is necessary. If,
however, the first buyer observes a high signal, she is going to buy the good, which will
trigger a purchasing decision by the follower if her signal is also high. The expected
losses from this decision pattern become high, and the regulator is going to chose to
incur the cost of conducting a test in order to avoid the expected losses leading to a
decrease in the social welfare.
The price of the good has to be sufficiently low to justify any cost of testing
c 2 (s1B , s̄1B ). However, Proposition 1.3 allows for greater range of prices compared
to the condition on price defined for the case of testing after the first NB decision
(section 1.4.2). The benefit of endogenous testing after the first B decision, ↵ (1
)(1

p) + (1

↵)(1

)2 p, includes the expected gain from buying a good of high

quality and the avoided expected loss from buying a good of low quality. The former
is decreasing in price, while the latter is increasing in price. Thus, values of p in
the upper range may be optimal if the e↵ect of avoiding the loss dominates. This is
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unlike the case of testing after the first consumer’s has abstained from buying, when
the benefit is comprised of the gain only.

1.4.2

Testing After the Early Adopter Does Not Buy

In this section we establish the conditions under which the regulator performs a test
if and only if the early adopter does no buys the product. To begin, we define two
threshold levels of testing cost:

s1N B =

(1

⇥
) ↵(1 + )(1 p) + (1
1 Y
s̄1N B =

(1

)↵(1
Y

p)

↵)(2

)p

⇤

,

.

Delaying a test until the first consumer’s decision to not buy in this pessimistic case
dominates testing at t = 0 when c > s1N B , and it dominates the option of no testing
when c < s̄1N B . When parameters of the model are such that s1N B

s̄1N B , waiting

is not optimal. Proposition 1.4 provides the conditions under which s1N B < s̄1N B .
Proposition 1.4. There exists a range of costs (s1N B , s̄1N B ) for which testing after
the early adopter has abstained from buying is optimal in the pessimistic case when
the following conditions are satisfied:

p 2 (↵, p̃1N B ),
where p̃1N B =

↵(( + 1)Y (1 Y ))
↵(( + 1)Y (1 Y )) (1 ↵)(2
↵>

1
4

4
,
8

> 0.75.

Proof. See Appendix A.
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(1.11)
)Y

,

(1.12)
(1.13)
(1.14)

Testing after the early adopter’s decision to abstain can be optimal when the
cost of adoption is sufficiently low because such testing allows to obtain additional
expected benefit ↵(1

)(1 p). This benefit arises due to the change in the follower’s

purchasing decision: she would have followed the early adopter’s choice to not buy
unless she learned that the true quality of the good is high. The benefit is decreasing
in p, thus lower price will lead to greater increase in the expected payo↵ resulting
from delayed testing.
According to Proposition 1.4, waiting until the first consumer abstains is optimal
when the signal precision, the prior probability that the true quality of the good is
QH , and potential losses from not purchasing a high quality product are sufficiently
high. In this pessimistic case, when the first consumer abstains from buying, the
follower is not going to buy even if her signal is sH . Even though ex ante it is more
likely that the early adopter receives a high signal and ends up buying the good, ex
post after her low signal, the follower will not buy as well, thus the expected losses
increase. This provides the incentive for the regulator to conduct the test in oder to
avoid high expected losses.
Similar to the optimistic case, Propositions 1.3 and 1.4 establish the conditions
under which there exist two ranges of costs such that delayed quality testing is
dominating, and these conditions cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Thus only one
strategy of delayed testing can be optimal.
Table 1.4 provides numerical examples which compare the welfare resulting from
four testing decisions by the regulator in the pessimistic case for given parameter
values. Testing after the first abstaining decision results in the smallest total payo↵s
when testing after the first purchasing decision is optimal. The opposite holds for the
case when testing after the early adopter does not buy is optimal.

We can discuss the situations when delaying a quality test is not optimal. Given
the conditions on testing costs in Propositions 1.1 - 1.4, delaying a test is dominated
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Table 1.4 Total expected payo↵s for given parameter values in the pessimistic
scenario.
After 1B

After 1NB

0.78

0.9

0.78

0.9

Condition on ↵↵ 2 ( 0.0008, 0.0536)

↵  0.051

↵ > 0.946

↵ > 0.813

0.05

0.99

0.99

Price range

(0.01, 0.027)

(0.05, 0.32]

(0.99, 0.993)

(0.99, 0.998)

p

0.015

0.2

0.992

0.995

s

0.0098

0.0314

0.0074

0.0023

s̄

0.0107

0.0393

0.0077

0.0046

s

0.01

0.035

0.0075

0.003

OP t=0

0.0097

0.045

0.00834

0.0069

OP N o

0.00969

0.0475

0.00833

0.0074

OP 1B

0.0098

0.0481

0.00437

0.0052

0.0041

0.0214

0.00838

0.0075

↵

OP 1N B

0.01

Note: The numbers in bold demonstrate the dominance of delayed testing over testing at t=0 and no testing at all
since the resulting total expected payo↵ is the highest.
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by testing prior to any purchasing decisions when the costs are sufficiently low and
are smaller than the value of the lower bound specified in the propositions. On the
other hand, when the costs are high and greater than the upper bound, then never
testing is better.
Another case when delayed testing is not optimal is when the ranges of costs
specified in Propositions 1.1 - 1.4 do not exist. In particular, delayed testing can
never be optimal when private signal is sufficiently imprecise ( < 0.75). When the
signal is sufficiently precise and the prior belief that the product is of high quality is
sufficiently high (↵ >

3 4
4 8

), then testing after observing the first consumer buying can

not be optimal in both optimistic and pessimistic cases because this will be a socially
desirable action. When private signal is precise and prior probability is low, testing
after observing the first consumer buying is not optimal for sufficiently low prices in
the optimistic case (p 2 [ ↵(1
pessimistic case (p 2 [p̃1B , ↵

↵(1 )
)+(1 ↵)

↵
+(1 ↵)(1

, p⇤1B ]), and for sufficiently high prices in the
)

]), because these prices will imply sufficiently

low benefit of delayed testing.
Testing after the first consumer has abstained from buying is not optimal when
signal is precise enough and the prior belief that the product is of high quality is
sufficiently low (↵ <

1 4
4 8

). When, however, the signal is sufficiently precise and

prior probability is sufficiently high, then delaying a test until the first consumer
does not buy is not optimal for the same range of prices in the optimistic case (p 2
[ ↵(1

↵(1 )
)+(1 ↵)

1.5

, p⇤1B ]), and in the pessimistic case (p 2 [p̃1B , ↵

↵
+(1 ↵)(1

)

]).

Concluding Remarks

The regulation literature often concentrates on designing regulatory mechanisms that
can increase social welfare, however, the idea that the regulator can postpone tests in
order to learn more from the market has been generally ignored in the literature. We
study the optimality of delaying quality testing of a good when the regulator and the
consumers are uncertain about its true quality. We allow the regulator as well as other
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market participants to gain access to a greater pool of information about the product
quality by observing early customers’ informative decisions. The optimality of a delay
depends on, the level of testing cost, the consumers’ prior beliefs, the quality of their
private signals, and the price of the good. When ex post the consumers are likely to
make socially desirable decisions, there is no need for quality testing, and the costs
associated with it are eliminated.
Our model sheds some light on the reasons for the government regulation strategies
in certain cases. Quality control after observed buying decisions becomes important
once the expected losses to the later consumers who will buy low quality products are
high enough. In terms of Zicam example, after having a large number of people buying
it, regulation became optimal as it prevented potential losses related to health issues
of the future consumers. Testing after observed decisions to abstain can be relevant in
the situations when the government aims to promote the adoption of new technologies
or practices, for example, in agricultural sector10 .

10

Kislev and Schori-Bachrach (1973) found using data from Israel that new technologies were
first adopted by small subgroups of farmers. Government testing of the quality of new technology
in such situation could deliver additional information and speed up the adoption. Botelho et al.
(2012) showed that adoption of a particular apple variety by Portuguese farmers was a↵ected by
amount and reliability of information and technical guidance which is supportive of the policy of
government intervention. The approval by the FDA of rbST (recombinant bovine Somatotropin) in
milk production over 10 years after it became available can be related to the small number of early
adopters (Butler and Henriques, 2001). If the government believed that the new technology was
promising, intervention was needed to reveal better information about the new technology.
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Chapter 2
Fixed Cancellation Payments and
the Hold-up Problem
2.1

Introduction

Contracts with fixed cancellation payments are frequently observed in practice, for
example, government procurement contracts, buyout clauses in sports contracts, and
severance agreements which compensate CEOs in the event of termination. In sports,
contracts often include termination penalties imposed on the party that initiates
separation. These penalties are usually set fixed, and even though they decrease
if separation occurs in later periods of time relative to the length of the contract,
the amounts are often significantly high 1 . CEO exit packages can also reach large
amounts 2 . These payments are thought to provide CEOs with incentives to increase
1

For example, the University of Tennessee has to pay a total of about 5 million
dollars through 2016 to its former football coach Derek Dolley after firing him in
2012 (source: http://www.govolsxtra.com/news/2013/mar/01/derek-dooley-and-fired-assistantswill-cost-ut/). Auburn University was obligated to pay its former football coach Gene Chizik
7.5 million dollars (source: http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2012/11/25/coachesbuyouts-sec-gene-chizik-auburn-derek-dooley-tennessee/1725765/).
2
Among others, Bob Nardelli, The Home Depot Inc. CEO, received 223 million dollars after
leaving the company in 2007. The CEO of CVS Caremark Corp., Thomas Ryan, received 185
million dollars in severance pay in 2011 (source: http://moneymorning.com/2013/03/18/top-10ceo-severance-packages/).
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firms’ profitability. However, according to Mansi et al. (2013), severance agreements
are associated with increased firm risk and lower operating performance. Huang
(2011) states in her study that severance agreements result in overinvestment in
research and development, weak corporate governance, and more frequent CEO
dismissal. In this paper, we refer to this situation as the reverse hold-up problem
- the case when inefficiently high level of e↵ort is exerted or when inefficiently high
investments are made by an agent in the light of high payment to her by a principal
when a contract is cancelled. The goal of this study is to investigate theoretically
and experimentally the e↵ects of a principal’s fixed cancellation payment to an agent
on the agent’s incentives to exert e↵ort. In particular, we analyze how setting a
cancellation payment at various levels a↵ects the hold-up problem. We show that for
optimal levels of cancellation payment the hold-up problem is mitigated, and that low
payment leads to a standard hold-up problem. However, if the amount of payment is
set too high, it can have opposite e↵ect and the reverse hold-up problem is observed.
The hold-up problem arises when, due to incomplete contracts, the proceeds of
relationship-specific investments are divided between the parties through ex post
renegotiation. Since the agent is no longer guaranteed her expected payo↵, she has
no incentive to invest efficiently (Williamson, 1985). The formal model of the holdup problem was developed by Hart and Moore (1988) who established that contract
renegotiation led to inefficient investments. However, it has been shown that the
hold-up problem can be overcome by including in the contract appropriately designed
renegotiation conditions. Chung (1991) and Aghion et al. (1994) achieved a first-best
outcome by assigning a default option in case of renegotiation and by providing one
of the players with residual rights over the proceeds. Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995)
showed that the hold-up problem could be solved with a simple option contract under
the assumption that courts were able to verify the delivery of the good. In the above
papers, socially desirable decisions are induced by changed threatpoint payo↵s in the
bargaining game. Che and Sakovics (2004) o↵ered a noncontractual solution to the
hold-up problem by making investments and negotiations dynamic. In their paper,
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punishments for low investments result in decreased disagreement payo↵s and thus
can lead to equilibria with higher investments. Our study concentrates on cancellation
payments as a potential solution to the hold-up problem. The similarity of this paper
to the above literature is that conditional on the investment being made the threat
point is changed.
We consider a model with an agent who has to make an unverifiable investment
that enhances a principal’s valuation of the good being traded. The parties cannot
write an explicit contract before the investment stage, however they can enter an
implicit contract which cannot be legally enforced. The contract is in the form of a
cost-plus type contract. This type of contracts is common when there are uncertainties
associated with the cost of performance and is used by federal agencies3 as well as in
the engineering and construction industries. After observing the level of investments
made by the agent, the principal can always renegotiate the terms of the implicit
contract. In this case, the principal pays a fixed amount to the agent and the surplus
is divided through Nash bargaining. If the agent does not enter the contract, she is
entitled to the value of outside option.
We derive equilibrium predictions assuming that the principal and the agent have
selfish preferences. We first establish the conditions that determine the principal’s
decision to accept the existing implicit contract or to renegotiate it. We then proceed
with analyzing the agent’s decisions. Our results are as follows. When high investment
is socially desirable, it can be induced by sufficiently high fixed cancellation payment.
In this case, the principal accepts any contract in order to avoid high payment to the
agent, and the agent anticipating this invests high if the outside option is sufficiently
low. When the situation is opposite and low investment is socially efficient due to
increased cost of making high investment, this leads to the reverse hold-up problem.
When the amount of cancellation payment is reduced to some medium level,
the principal’s strategy changes.

She still accepts low-investment contracts and

renegotiates high-investment ones in order to avoid high payments to the agent due
3

For example, by the Department of Defense for weapon programs that require new technologies.
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in case of accepting high-investment contract. Knowing that, the agent invests high
if doing so generates sufficiently high value, or otherwise if the amount of cancellation
payment at least covers the di↵erence of her payo↵s under low and high-investment
contracts. If low level of investment is socially desirable, the reverse hold-up problem
arises. If the amount of cancellation payment is reduced, the agent’s incentive to invest
high is distorted and her private optimum now coincides with the social optimum.
This also implies the standard hold-up problem when high investment is optimal.
Finally, with no cancellation payment or when it is too low, unless the outside
option is high enough, the agent enters a contract, and the principal always
renegotiates it. Considering the case when high investment is socially desirable, it is
shown that optimum can be achieved only if high investment generates sufficiently
high value and that cancellation payment has no e↵ect on the agent’s investment
decision. When not enough value is generated, the standard hold-up problem is
observed. Conversely, high investments result in the reverse hold-up problem when
low investments are socially optimal.
We test the validity of our predictions using a controlled laboratory experiment.
In particular, our experiment studies the e↵ects of di↵erent levels of cancellation
payment on agent’s investment behavior. Data from the experiment are consonant
with the comparative static predictions of our theory and suggest the promise of
cancellation payments as a means to attenuate hold-up. There exists evidence in the
literature that suggests that higher than optimal levels of investments observed in
the experiments can be attributed to fairness concerns4 . To test for the existence
of social preferences in our study, we conduct additional treatments in which o↵equilibrium option leads to equitable outcomes. We do not observe significant change
in investment behavior resulting from this modification in three out of five treatments.
The subgame perfect equilibrium is played significantly more often in one of the
remained treatments, and it is played significantly less often in the last treatment.
4

See, for example, Hackett (1994), Charness and Rabin (2002), Nelson (2002), Ellingsen and
Johannesson (2004a, 2004b), Falk et al. (2008), Dufwenberg et al. (2013). See von Siemens (2009)
for theoretical explanation of investment incentives based on fairness preferences.
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More closely related to our study is the contribution by Sloof et al. (2006). In
their experiment, the e↵ects of four breach remedies (liquidated damages, expectation
damages, reliance damages, and specific performance) on investment behavior are
analyzed. In our paper, the fixed payment is analogous to liquidated damages. They
test theoretical predictions that investments are efficient under liquidated damages
and are too high under reliance and expectation damages. Thus, they consider only
optimally set liquidated damages unlike this study which analyzes too high and too
low fixed payments. Also, in the experiment by Sloof et al. (2006), overinvestment is
observed on average in liquidated-damages treatment, whereas we observe subgame
perfect equilibrium outcomes most of the time in cases when fixed payment is set to
induce optimal investments.
The paper proceeds as follows. Formal model is developed in Section 2.2. The
details of the experimental design are presented in Section 2.3. We parametrize the
model, describe the treatments and state the predictions in Section 2.4. Results are
discussed in Section 2.5. Sections 2.6 concludes.

2.2

Model

We consider a static model of bilateral trade of a unit of some good between a principal
and an agent. In order to deliver the good, the agent has to make a relationshipspecific investment e 2 {eL , eH } with eL being low level of investment and eH being
high level of investment. The investment is observable by both parties, but cannot
be verified. Thus, there is no explicit contract ex ante. The cost of investment e is
c(e), where c(eL ) = cL < c(eH ) = cH . The investment is cooperative5 meaning that
the value of the good to the principal depends on the agent’s investment level e and
is given by strictly concave function V (e), where V (eL ) = VL < V (eH ) = VH .
At stage t = 1, the agent decides between entering or not entering the implicit
contract. Conditional on entering the contract, the agent must choose her level of
5

Following Che and Hausch (1999).
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investment. If the agent does not enter the contract, she receives the value of an
outside option ⌘. At stage t = 2 after observing the agent’s investment level, the
principal can either accept the implicit contract or renegotiate it. In the case of
renegotiation, the original implicit contract is canceled , there a fixed amount K is
paid by the principal to the agent. Renegotiation takes the form of Nash bargaining
over the value of trade to the principal and the threat point to the agent.
We consider cost-plus type contracts, where the agent is covered the cost of
production plus additional payment to allow for a profit. In the case of accepting
the implicit contract, the payo↵ to the agent is given by uA = (↵
↵ > 1 , and the payo↵ to the principal is given by vA = V (e)
of renegotiation, the agent’s payo↵ is uR = 12 [V (e) + K]
payo↵ is vR = 12 [V (e)

1)c(e), where

↵c(e). In the case

c(e), and the principal’s

K]. At stage t = 2, the agent will always want to complete

the exchange of the good even if the principal chooses to renegotiate since by walking
away the agent incurs a loss of c(e).
The problem is a dynamic game with complete information with corresponding
solution concept being subgame perfect equilibrium. The agent’s strategy determines
an investment e; the principal’s strategy determines her acceptance decision conditional on the observed investment e. Subgame perfect equilibria are determined by
backward induction. We are going to derive equilibrium predictions assuming that
the principal and the agent have preferences defined solely over their own monetary
payo↵s. The principal chooses to accept an implicit contract with a given level of
investment by the agent over renegotiating it if the fixed payment in the case of
renegotiation is higher than the threshold level:
K

2↵c(e)

V (e).

Proposition 2.1. Equilibrium bargaining when 2↵cH
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(2.1)
VH

2↵cL

VL

1. When K

2↵cH VH , the principal accepts any contract while the agent chooses

high investment conditional on entering the contract. The agent enters if ⌘ 
(↵

1)cH 6 .

2. When 2↵cH

VH > K

2↵cL

VL , the principal accepts only low-investment

contracts and renegotiates high-investment contracts. The agent chooses high
investment when either VH
K

2(↵

1)cL + 2cH

VL + 2(cH

cL ) or otherwise when 2↵cH

VH . She enters such contract if ⌘  12 (VH + K)

The agent chooses low investment when 2(↵ 1)cL +2cH
and she enters the contract if ⌘  (↵

VH > K

VH >
cH .

2↵cL VL ,

1)cL .

3. When K < 2↵cL VL , the principal renegotiates any contract. The agent chooses
high investment when VH

VL + 2(cH

cL ) and low investment otherwise. She

enters a low-investment contract if ⌘  12 (VL + K)
contract if ⌘  12 (VH + K)

cL and a high-investment

cH .

When 2↵cH VH < 2↵cL VL , the principal accepts only high-investment contracts
and renegotiates low-investment ones if 2↵cL

VL > K

2↵cH

VH . The agent

always chooses high investment, and she enters the contract if ⌘  (↵

1)cH .

Proof. See Appendix B.

The principal’s decision depends on the fixed payment K and on the threshold
values for two di↵erent levels of agent’s investment. When there is a possibility of
renegotiation, the agent will strategically make a choice that leads to it if either the
value of her investments or if the amount of cancellation payment are sufficiently
large.
When VH

cH > V L

cL such that eH is socially optimal, the standard hold-up

problem exists if the conditions are such that the agent chooses low investment or stays
6

We assume that when indi↵erent between entering and not entering the contract, the agent
chooses to enter.
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out of the contract. When VH

cH < V L

cL , low investment eL is socially optimal.

In this case, the last equilibrium prediction for the case when 2↵cL

VL > 2↵cH

VH

in Proposition 2.1 becomes irrelevant. The reverse hold-up problem arises when the
conditions induce the agent to choose high investment. In particular, sufficiently high
cancellation payment or high value of the investment will lead to the reverse hold-up
problem.

2.3

Experimental design

A total of 176 subjects participated in our laboratory experiment. All subjects were
students of the University of Tennessee-Knoxville. The computerized experiment was
programmed in Java. The experiment was conducted in 10 sessions consisting of
10 rounds each in the UT Experimental Economics Laboratory during the Spring
2011 semester. The laboratory consisted of 24 networked computer workstations in
separate cubicles. No subject could participate in more than one session. Participants
were paid on average $14.19.
Subjects participated in ten di↵erent types of games. Each game required two
players. At the beginning of each session, half of the subjects were randomly assigned
to the role of Player 1 and the others to the role of Player 2, and remained in
the assigned role throughout the experiment. Each round, players were randomly
rematched with a di↵erent player of the opposite role. In all rounds, no subject
knew the identity of the player they were paired with. The order in which subject
participated in each of the ten games was randomized across sessions.
The experiment instructions and the game tree that was displayed to the subjects
are provided in Appendix B. In each round, Player 1 moves first by selecting one of
three options. Option J corresponds to low investment level by Player 1, option T
corresponds to high investment, and option N corresponds to Player’s 1 decision to
stay out of the contract in which case the game ends. Player 2 moves after options J
or T have been selected. She has to select one of two options. Option A corresponds
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to accepting the existing contract between Player 1 and Player 2, and option B
corresponds to renegotiating it. Once Player 2 has made the decision, the game ends.

2.4

Predictions

The main goal of our study is to experimentally investigate the question whether
particular levels of the fixed cancellation payment can lead to socially optimal
outcomes, standard or reverse hold-up problems. We conducted five main treatments.
Five additional treatments were performed in order to explore whether making the
principal’s and the agent’s payo↵s from certain strategies equitable a↵ects their
decisions. If participants are subject to fairness concerns, we expect to see lower
frequency of subgame perfect equilibrium plays.
We are going to derive predictions on how the behavior by the principal and by the
agent changes across treatments. The values of the parameters of the model used in
our main treatments are provided in Table 2.1. Given the parameters, all treatments
correspond to the case when 2↵cH

VH > 2↵cL

VL . Thus, both high or low levels

of investment can be optimal.
Base No Entry. In this treatment, the amount of fixed cancellation payment is
set equal to $0. The principal will renegotiate a contract with any level of investment
since K < 2↵cL

VL . Knowing that, the agent will choose to stay out of the implicit

contract and get her outside option of $7 (Table 2.2). In this case her payo↵ is
maximized. Given the parameters in this treatment, high level of investment is
socially optimal, thus a standard hold-up problem exists.
Base Standard Hold-up. Given K = $9, the principal’s strategy will be to accept
low-investment contracts and to renegotiate high-investment contracts since 2↵cH
VH > K

2↵cL

VL . Knowing that, the agent will choose low level of investment

because it maximizes her payo↵. She gets $8 under eL compared to $7 under eH .
However, the social optimum is high investment, and a standard hold-up problem
arises.
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Table 2.1 Parameters of the model used in the experiment
Treatment

cL

cH

VL

VH

⌘

K

SPE

Base No Entry

20

30

50

65

7

0

(N, B)

Base Reverse Hold-up

20

40

50

65

7

35

(T, B)

Base Low Optimal

20

40

50

65

7

20

(J, A)

Base High Optimal

20

30

50

65

7

35

(T, A)

Base Standard Hold-up

20

30

50

65

7

9

(J, A)
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Table 2.2 Payo↵s and equilibrium predictions
Treatment

No Entry

Low,
Accept

Low,
Renegotiate

High,
Accept

High,
Renegotiate

Base No Entry

(7,7)

(8,22)

(5,25)

(12,23)

(2.5,32.5)

Base Reverse Hold-up

(7,7)

(8,22)

(22.7,7.5)

(16,9)

(10,15)

Base Low Optimal

(7,7)

(8,22)

(15,15)

(16,9)

(2.5,22.5)

Base High Optimal

(7,7)

(8,22)

(22.5,7.5)

(12,23)

(20,15)

Base Standard Hold-up

(7,7)

(8,22)

(9.5,20.5)

(12,23)

(7,28)

Fair No Entry

(14,14)

(15,15)

(12,18)

(19,16)

(10,25)

Fair Reverse Hold-up

(14,14)

(15,15)

(25,5)

(21,4)

(17,8)

Fair Low Optimal

(14,14)

(15,15)

(22,8)

(21, 4)

(9,16)

Fair High Optimal

(14,14)

(15,15)

(25, 5)

(19,16)

(27,8)

Fair Standard Hold-up (14,14)

(15,15)

(17,13)

(19,16)

(14,21)

Note: Cell entries are payo↵s for both Player1 (agent) and Player 2 (principal) at the corresponding terminal node of
play. For each treatment, the subgame perfect payo↵s are in bold.
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In both treatments above, the amount of cancellation payment is sufficiently low
to make the principal want to renegotiate high-investment contracts which are socially
optimal. For the agent, the cancellation payment received when high investments are
made is not high enough to make her invest efficiently.
Prediction 1. Cancellation payment set too low can lead to standard hold-up problem;
i.e., in Base No Entry treatment it is more likely for Player 1 to choose N and in
Base Standard Hold-up treatment it is more likely for Player 1 to choose J.
Base Low Optimal. If the agent enters the implicit contract with K = $20, the
principal will accept it only if the investment is low. Anticipating the principal’s
behavior, the agent chooses eL , because then her payo↵ is $8, while it would be $2.5
under eH . In this treatment, VH

VL < cH

cL . Hence, socially optimal level of

investment is made.
Base High Optimal. When K = $35, the principal will accept both kinds of
contracts. This happens because now the cancellation payment paid out in the case
of renegotiation is sufficiently high (K

2↵cH

VH ). By accepting any contract,

the principal is able to avoid this payment. This implies that if the agent is better
o↵ with the contract, she will always choose high investment. She receives $12 under
eH compared to $8 under eL . Since VH

V L > cH

cL given the parameters of

the treatment, the first-best outcome is achieved. Notice that this treatment di↵ers
from the first two in the level of cancellation payment. Thus, compared to no or
low cancellation payment, setting it sufficiently high can enhance agent’s incentive to
invest and can solve hold-up problem.
Prediction 2. Cancellation payments can be used to promote socially optimal
outcomes; i.e., in Base Low Optimal treatment it is more likely for Player 1 to choose
J and in Base High Optimal treatment it is more likely for Player 1 to choose T.
Base Reverse Hold-up. The fixed cancellation payment to the agent is $35 which
means that the principal will accept low-investment contracts and she will renegotiate
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high-investment contracts (the strategy is di↵erent from Base High Optimal treatment
due to increased cost of high investment). Notice that the di↵erence of this treatment
from the Base Low Optimal is the level of K. Anticipating the principal’s decisions,
the agent will enter an implicit contract regardless of her choice of investment level
because the payo↵s with a contract are greater than the outside option. Since the
cancellation payment is now sufficiently high, the agent will choose high investment in
which case her payo↵ is maximized at $10 versus $8 under low investment. However,
low investment is socially optimal. Privately optimal high level of investment by the
agent results in reverse hold-up problem.
Prediction 3. Cancellation payments set too high can lead to reverse hold-up
problem; i.e., in Base Reverse Hold-up treatment it is more likely for Player 1 to
choose T.
We also conduct variants of five treatments described above. We use prefix Fair
to distinguish them from Base treatments. In each of five additional treatments, we
make the payo↵s to Players 1 and 2 equal not only if option N is selected, but also
when option J is selected by Player 1 and option A is selected by Player 2. The
subgame perfect equilibria are unchanged. We expect this modification can cause the
equatable option to be chosen more frequently and thus subgame perfect equilibrium
to be reached less often if subjects have fairness concerns. The frequency of subgame
perfect equilibrium play should be the same as in Base treatments though if subjects
are rational money-maximizers.
Prediction 4. The frequency of subgame perfect equilibrium play should not be greater
in Base treatments than in Fair treatments.
The goal of this experimental study is to test whether our predictions are
supported by the data.

36

2.5

Results

We start describing the results of our experiment with providing the frequencies of
each strategy for each of ten treatments across rounds in Table 2.3. A casual look at
the data suggests that subjects follow subgame perfect equilibrium play predicted
by the theory. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 o↵er a closer look at the data. Figure 2.1
shows the frequency of equilibrium choices by Players 1 and 2 and the frequency
of subgame perfect equilibrium for each of five base treatments. Figure 2.2 provides
same information for each of five Fair treatments. In all treatments except Base
Standard Hold-up and Fair No Entry, equilibrium decisions are made more than 70%
of the time. In Base Standard Hold-up treatment, these frequencies are above 40%,
and in Fair No Entry treatment, they are above 60%.
With regard to Base No Entry treatment, we find that the contract was rejected
by Player 1 in 70.45% of the cases. Socially optimal high investment was selected in
23.86% of the cases. Also, whenever Player 1 entered the contract, it was renegotiated
73% of the time. In Base Standard Hold-up treatment, low investment was chosen
in 52.27% of the cases. Socially optimal high investment was observed 25% of the
time. This supports our first prediction that low levels of cancellation payment do
not mitigate the hold-up problem with inefficiently low levels of investments. This
is consistent with the standard contract-theoretic literature on hold-up stating that
fear to be held-up by Player 2 stops Player 1 from entering the contract.
To test our Prediction 1, we compare the frequency of low-investment (no entry)
choices by player 1 in Standard Hold-up (No Entry) treatment where cancellation
payment is set too low to the frequency of low-investment choices in High Optimal
and Reverse Hold-up treatments where cancellation fee is set high (significance levels
are reported in Tables 2.4 and 2.5). We find that, in accordance with Prediction
1, decisions leading to the standard hold-up problem are selected significantly more
often under low cancellation fee in Standard Hold-up and No Entry treatments.
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Table 2.3 Observed frequency of play
Treatment

No Entry

Base No Entry
Base
Base
Base
Base

70.45
(12.5)
Reverse Hold-up
1.13
(0)
Low Optimal
15.9
(12.5)
High Optimal
4.54
(0)
Standard Hold-up 22.72
(30)

Fair No Entry
Fair
Fair
Fair
Fair

65.9
(77.77)
Reverse Hold-up
6.81
(22.22)
Low Optimal
11.36
(11.11)
High Optimal
4.54
(28.57)
Standard Hold-up
3.4
(0)

Low,
Accept

Low,
Renegotiate

High
Accept

High
Renegotiate

2.27
(12.5)
9.09
(40)
70.45
(25)
5.68
(33.33)
43.18
(20)

3.4
(12.5)
0
(0)
11.36
(62.5)
0
(0)
9.09
(10)

5.68
(12.5)
2.27
(10)
0
(0)
84.09
(44.44)
19.31
(20)

18.18
(50)
87.5
(50)
2.27
(0)
5.68
(22.22)
5.68
(20)

4.54
(0)
18.18
(55.55)
78.4
(55.55)
6.81
(14.28)
77.27
(44.44)

19.31
(22.22)
1.13
(0)
3.4
(11.11)
0
(0)
2.27
(0)

1.13
(0)
1.13
(11.11)
0
(0)
87.5
(42.85)
1.13
(11.11)

9.09
(0)
72.72
(11.11)
6.81
(22.22
1.13
(14.28)
15.9
(44.44)

Note: Cell entries are the observed frequency of play for each terminal node pooled over ten periods. The frequency of
play for the given treatment in round 1 is given in parentheses. For each treatment, the subgame perfect predictions
are in bold.
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Figure 2.1: Base Equilibrium Play
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Figure 2.2: Fair Equilibrium Play
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Table 2.4 Significance levels for pairwise comparisons of L (low investment) choice
by Player 1 between treatments.
Standard Hold-up
vs. Reverse Hold-up

Standard Hold-up
vs. High Optimal

Base

<0.0001

<0.0001

Fair

<0.0001

<0.0001
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Table 2.5 Significance levels for pairwise comparisons of N (no entry) choice by
Player 1 between treatments.
No Entry
vs. Reverse Hold-up

No Entry
vs. High Optimal

Base

<0.0001

<0.0001

Fair

<0.0001

<0.0001
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Consider now Base Low Optimal and Base High Optimal treatments. We observe
Player 1 selecting low investment 81.81% of the time in Base Low Optimal treatment.
High investment is observed 89.77% of all choices in Base High Optimal treatment.
This is in line with our second prediction that it is possible to provide the incentives
for any socially optimal level of investment by changing the amount of cancellation
payment. Indeed, after increasing just the amount of cancellation payment from
$9 to $35, the number of high investment choices went from 44 in Base Standard
Entry to 158 in Base High Optimal treatments. We perform two-sided tests on the
equity of the frequencies of socially optimal decisions by player 1 between treatments
where cancellation payment is set optimally and treatments where it is not set
optimally. Significance levels are reported in Table 2.6. The results suggest that
socially optimal level of investment is selected in Low Optimal and High Optimal
treatments significantly more frequent compared to No Entry, Standard Hold-up,
and Reverse Hold-up treatments, which supports our Prediction 2.
In our Base Reverse Hold-up treatment, low investment was socially optimal, but
high level of investment was selected 89.77% of the time. When high investment was
made, the contract was renegotiated 97.46% of the time allowing Player 1 to receive
high cancellation payment from Player 2. Low investments were made only 9.09% of
the time. Notice, that the di↵erence between this treatment and Base Low Optimal
treatment is increased level of cancellation payment from $20 to $35. The number of
high investments went from 4 in Base Low Optimal treatment to 158 in Base Reverse
Hold-up. This is in accordance with our third prediction that inefficiently high levels
of investment take place when cancellation payment is set too high. Mansi et al.
(2013) find empirical evidence that CEO severance agreements are associated with
some negative e↵ects on a firm’s performance including an increase in firm risk. Our
experiment establishes a causal impact of large cancellation payments which play a
role of severance agreement on the agent’s e↵ort.
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Table 2.6 Significance levels for pairwise comparisons of socially optimal choices by Player 1 between
treatments.

Base
Fair

Low Optimal
vs. No Entry
<0.0001
<0.0001

Low Optimal vs.
Standard Hold-up
<0.0001
<0.0001

Low Optimal vs.
Reverse Hold-up
<0.0001
<0.0001
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High Optimal
vs. No Entry
<0.0001
<0.0001

High Optimal vs.
Standard Hold-up
<0.0001
<0.0001

High Optimal vs.
Reverse Hold-up
<0.0001
<0.0001

We test the equality of the frequencies of high-investment choice by player 1
in Reverse Hold-up treatment where cancellation payment is set too high and in
Low Optimal and Standard Hold-up treatments where cancellation fee is set low
(significance levels are reported in Table 2.7). Along with Prediction 3, our subjects
picked high investments leading to the reverse hold-up problem significantly more
often under high cancellation fee in Reverse Hold-up treatment.
In all Base treatments the subjects act like rational money maximizers.

To

allow for the possibility of fairness concerns, we constructed Fair treatments making
strategy (J, A) result in equitable outcomes. If subjects have preferences for fair
outcomes, we should observe less frequent subgame perfect equilibrium play in our
Fair treatments. Analyzing the data from five Fair treatments, we find patterns
similar to Base treatments. In Fair No Entry treatment, Player 1 chooses to stay out
of the contract 65.9% of the time. High investment is socially optimal and is selected
only 10.22% of the time. In Fair Standard Entry treatment, low investments were
made in 79.54% of the cases, and socially optimal high investments were made in
17.04% of the cases. This corresponds to the standard hold-up problem. We observe
high frequency of socially optimal investments in both Fair High Optimal and Fair
Low Optimal treatments. In particular, low investments were selected 81.81% of the
time in Fair Low Optimal, and high investments were selected 88.63% of the time in
Fair High Optimal. Finally, in Fair Reverse Hold-up treatment, socially inefficient
high investments are made 73.86% of the time.
The comparison of frequencies of equilibrium choices between Base and Fair
treatments is provided in Figures 2.3 - 2.7. We perform two-sided tests on the equity
of the frequencies of subgame perfect equilibrium and of equilibrium decisions by
both players between corresponding treatments. Significance levels are reported in
Table 2.8.
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Table 2.7 Significance levels for pairwise comparisons of T (high investment) choice
by Player 1 between treatments.
Reverse Hold-up
vs. Standard Hold-up

Reverse Hold-up
vs. Low Optimal

Base

<0.0001

<0.0001

Fair

<0.0001

<0.0001
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Figure 2.3: No Entry
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Figure 2.4: Standard Hold-up
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Figure 2.5: Low Optimal
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Figure 2.6: High Optimal

50

Figure 2.7: Reverse Hold-up
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Table 2.8 Significance levels for pairwise comparisons of equilibrium choices by Player
1 and Player 2 and of subgame perfect equilibrium between treatments.
No Entry Standard Hold-up Low Optimal High Optimal Reverse Hold-up
Base vs. Fair Base vs. Fair Base vs. Fair Base vs. Fair Base vs. Fair
Player 1

0.5174

0.0001

1

0.8081

0.0062

Player 2

0.2963

<0.0001

0.0419

0.2652

0.1195

SPE

0.5174

<0.0001

0.2265

0.5171

0.0141
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In line with Prediction 4, we find that social preferences have no e↵ect in No
Entry, High Optimal treatments, and Low Optimal treatments with exception of
Player 2’s equilibrium play in Fair Low Optimal treatment. Making acceptance
of a low-investment contract result in equal payo↵s to both players enhances her
equilibrium play as well as all equilibrium plays in Fair Standard Entry treatment.
Also, in Fair Standard Entry treatment not only we observe significantly more subjects
choosing option J, but significantly fewer subjects are choosing option N which was
the only choice with equitable payo↵s in the Base Standard Entry treatment. Possible
reason for such redistribution of plays might be due to preferences for equality. Even
though the equilibrium strategy in Fair No Entry treatment is played approximately
as often as in the Base No Entry treatment, option J resulting in equitable payo↵s is
played significantly more frequent in Fair No Entry treatment 7 . This trend might be
observed due to Players 1 either having concerns for equality or hoping that Players
2 act reciprocally and choose option A.
In Fair Reverse Hold-up treatment, the subgame perfect equilibrium is the most
common outcome, however it is reached significantly less often compared to the Base
treatment. Also, Player1’s equilibrium choice is statistically less frequent in Fair
Reverse Hold-up compared to Base Reverse Hold-up treatment. These di↵erences
are due to the first player choosing equatable option (low investment) more often in
Fair Reverse Hold-up8 , thus we observe some e↵ect of social preferences, potentially
inequality aversion, in this case.
To summarize, all four predictions are supported by the data. We find strong
evidence that varying the levels of cancellation payment has e↵ect on the hold-up
problem: it arises when K is too low, it can be mitigated when K is sufficiently high,
and it can be reversed when K is too high. This e↵ect remains when one of the
7

Two-sided tests on the equity of proportions of low-investment decisions by Player 1 in Base No
Entry and Fair No Entry treatments: H0 : Prop(Base) = Prop(Fair) with P-value = 0.0007.
8
Two-sided tests on the equity of proportions of low-investment decisions by Player 1 in Base
Reverse Hold-up and Fair Reverse Hold-up treatments: H0 : Prop(Base) = Prop(Fair) with P-value
= 0.052.
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strategies leads to equal payo↵s to both players, however, we observe some evidence
of social preferences in three out of five Fair treatments. This evidence is not as
prominent as the results of other experiments aimed to study the hold-up problem.
The scope of our experiment does not allow us to deeper understand the drivers of
subjects’ choices, and it is the area of further investigation.

2.6

Conclusion

This paper analyzes the e↵ects of varying the levels of fixed cancellation payment in
the cost-plus type contract on the hold-up problem. In particular, we are interested
in the situation when high enough cancellation payment leads to the reverse hold-up
problem, a case when inefficiently high investments intended to enhance a good’s
valuation are made. We report the results of the laboratory experiment that tests
our theoretical predictions. The observed frequencies of subgame perfect equilibrium
play in our five main treatments support the predictions.
Assuming that the observed play may be a result of the subjects’ fairness concerns,
we conduct additional treatments. We change the payo↵ structure slightly to make
certain strategies result in equitable payo↵s.

No changes to the strategy space

or equilibrium path were made. However, we still find that subjects follow the
equilibrium strategy most of the time. We conclude that most of the time our subjects
were not driven by social preferences when making their decisions. We observe some
evidence of fairness concerns, potentially inequality aversion, in three out of five
additional treatments when the option leading to the equitable outcome is picked
more frequently by the first player relative to the corresponding Base treatment.
Future investigation of the reasons driving the subjects’ decisions, and particularly
prefrences for fairness, is of main interest.
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A

Now, Tomorrow, or Never: The Optimality of
Delaying Quality Tests

Here we describe the early adopter’s and the follower’s purchasing decisions. The
early adopter purchases the product after receiving a high signal sH if
↵
↵ + (1

↵)(1

)

(1

(1 ↵)(1
)
p
↵ + (1 ↵)(1
)

p)

0,

or
↵

p

↵ + (1

↵)(1

)

(⌘ D).

She buys the product after observing a low signal sL if
↵(1
)
(1
↵(1
) + (1 ↵)

(1 ↵)
↵(1
) + (1

p)

↵)

p > 0,

or
p<

↵(1
)
(⌘ B).
↵(1
) + (1 ↵)

Note that D > B, thus for sufficiently low prices (p < B) the early adopter buys
the product even if her signal is low, and for sufficiently high prices (p > D) she
abstains from buying even if her signal is high. Such decisions provide no additional
information to the follower, and she finds herself in the position of the early adopter
with only one signal. When p 2 [B, D], the early adopter follows her signal.
We now discuss the purchasing decisions by the follower. If there are two high
signals, the follower purchases the product if
↵
↵

2

+ (1

2

↵)(1
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2

(1 ↵)(1
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0,

The follower buys the product after two low signals if

↵(1

↵(1
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The follower’s buying decision after two opposite signals is determined by

↵ (1

↵ (1
) + (1

)
↵) (1

)

(1

p)

(1
↵ (1

↵) (1
)
) + (1 ↵) (1

)

p

0,

or

p  ↵(⌘ C).
Note, that E > D, thus for p 2 (D, E) (see Figure A.1) the follower still does
not purchase because she acts as if she was the early adopter. Also, A < B, thus for
p 2 [A, B) the follower still buys the product because the early adopter’s action is
not informative. For p 2 [B, C] the early adopter follows her signal and the follower
purchases after two high signals or two opposite signals, and she abstains from buying
after two low signals. For p 2 (C, D] the early adopter follows her signal as well, and
the follower now buys only after two high signals and abstains from buying after
conflicting signals and two low signals.

A

B

C

D

Figure A.1: Price ranges
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E

p

Proof of Lemma 1.3. We first are going to derive the condition on price for which the
range of costs (s1B , s̄1B ) exists. It has to be that s1B < s̄1B , or
⇥
) 2↵(1

(1

p) + (1

↵)p

Y

⇤

<

⇥
) ↵ (1

(1

p) + (1
1 Y

↵)(1

)p

⇤

,

which holds for p < p̃1B .
↵
+(1 ↵)(1

Prices that satisfy the condition p < p̃1B have to be in the range of (↵, ↵

)

]

for the pessimistic case. If p̃1B is less than the lower bound ↵, then no value of price
exists in the pessimistic scenario for which s1B < s̄1B . Thus, p̃1B has to be greater
than the lower bound ↵, which it holds when
↵<

3
4

4
.
8

(2)

Since ↵ 2 (0, 1), there exists a value of ↵ which satisfies condition (2) when
> 0.75.
Whether p̃1B is greater or less than the upper bound

↵
↵ +(1 ↵)(1

)

depends on

the level of prior probability ↵. In particular, the value of p̃1B is greater, and thus
condition p < p̃1B is binding, when ↵ >

2 3 2 3 +2)
9
.
(1 2 )( 2 2 + +2)

Latter condition on ↵

together with condition (2) limit the range of values that ↵ can take, and together
with price range and condition on

establish the first set of conditions for the range

of costs (s1B , s̄1B ) to exist.
The value of lower bound is greater than p̃1B and thus is binding when ↵ <
2 3 2 3 +2)
.
(1 2 )( 2 2 + +2)

This condition on ↵ is stricter than condition (2), and it can be

satisfied only when

is greater than 0.78110 . This results in the second set of

conditions for the range of costs (s1B , s̄1B ) to exist.
We now are going to show that for c 2 (s1B , s̄1B ) the regulator performs a test if

and only if the first consumer buys the product. It has to be that OP 1B > OP 1N B
9
10

Note, that
When

2
2 3
3 +2)
(1 2 )( 2 2 + +2)

<

3 4
4 8

for

> 0.75.

 0.781, the condition on ↵ is not satisfied because
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2
(2
3)
(1 2 )( 2 2 + +2)

 0.

for testing after 1B to be the optimal strategy. This holds when
c > c0 .

(3)

Note that p > ↵ since this is the pessimistic case, thus the numerator of c0 is
greater than zero. Also, ↵ <

1 4
4 8

<

1
,
2

thus the denominator of c0 is negative.

Condition (3) holds for any c, and testing after 1B is the best strategy

Proof of Lemma 1.4. We first are going to derive the condition on price for which the
range of costs (s1N B , s̄1N B ) exists. It has to be that s1N B < s̄1N B , or
⇥
) ↵(1 + )(1 p) + (1
1 Y

(1

↵)(2

)p

⇤

<

(1

)↵(1
Y

p)

,

which holds for p < p̃1N B .
Since this is the pessimistic case which is defined for the range of prices
(↵, ↵

↵
+(1 ↵)(1

)

], it has to be the case that p̃1N B is greater than the lower bound

↵. This is satisfied when ↵ >

1 4
4 8

. Since ↵ 2 (0, 1), there exists a value of ↵ that
> 34 .

satisfies the latter inequality when

Also, p̃1N B is less than the upper bound

↵
↵ +(1 ↵)(1

11
)

, and thus p < p̃1N B is

binding condition on price.
We now are going to show that for c 2 (s1N B , s̄1N B ) the regulator performs a test
if and only if the first consumer abstains from buying the product. It has to be that
OP 1N B > OP 1B for testing after 1NB to be the optimal strategy. This holds when
c > c0 .
3

2

p̃1N B < ↵ +(1 ↵↵)(1 ) for ↵ < (1 22 )( 2
of the latter inequality is greater than one.
11

3 +1
2 + +2)
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(4)

which always holds because the right-hand side

Note that c0 < s1N B when
p<

(1

↵(1 + )(1 2Y ) + ↵(1
)(1 Y )
)(1 Y ) + (1 2Y )(↵(1 + ) (1 ↵)(2

)

,

(5)

which is always satisfied because the right-hand side of (5) is greater than one when
conditions (1.11), (1.13), and (1.14) hold. Also note that p̃1N B < 1. Thus, when
(s1N B , s̄1N B ) exists and c is belongs to that range, condition (4) is satisfied and testing
after 1NB is the best strategy.
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B

Cancellation Payments and the Hold-up Problem

Proof of Lemma 2.1. We start the proof with the first equilibrium prediction. Since
the principal accepts a contract when the payo↵ from accepting it is at least as high as
her payo↵ from renegotiation according to condition (2.1), then for K
2↵cL

2↵cH

VL accepting any contract is her best strategy. Suppose that ⌘ > (↵

then ⌘ > (↵

VH
1)cH ,

1)cL , and staying out of the contract is the best strategy for the agent

since her payo↵ is maximized in this case. Suppose that ⌘  (↵

1)cH , then high

investment is the agent’s best strategy since her payo↵ is solely determined by her
cost and cH > cL .
When 2↵cH

VH > K

2↵cL

VL , the principal accepts low-investment

contracts according to condition (2.1). She renegotiates high-investment contracts
since her payo↵ from renegotiating is higher than her payo↵ from accepting it:
1
[V
2 H

K] > VH

↵cH . When the principal accepts low-investment contracts and

rejects high-investment contracts, conditional on entering the agent chooses eH if the
fixed cancellation payment is sufficiently high such that her payo↵ is maximized:
K

2(↵

1)cL + 2cH

VH .

(6)

The lower bound on K for the agent to choose eH in (6) is not greater than
the lower bound on K for the principal to accept low-investment contracts when
(VH

VL )

2(cH

cL ). Then condition (6) is nonbinding and the agent chooses

high investment as long as the value resulted from the investment is high enough.
When the opposite is true and VH

VL < 2(cH

binding and the agent exerts eH if 2↵cH

VH > K

exerts eL if 2(↵

2↵cL

1)cL + 2cH

VH > K

cL ), then condition (6) becomes
2(↵

1)cL + 2cH

VH , and she

VL . Thus, knowing the principal’s

strategy, the agent induces renegotiation if the cancellation payment to her is larger
enough, otherwise, she prefers the contract to be accepted. The agent chooses to not
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enter such contracts if the outside option value is sufficiently high: ⌘ > (↵
low-investment contract and ⌘ > 12 (VH + K)
When K < 2↵cL

1)cL for

cH for high-investment contract.

VL , then it is also the case that K < 2↵cH

VH , and according

to condition (2.1) the principal will renegotiate any contract. The agent chooses high
investment if her payo↵ from doing so is at least as high than the payo↵ from choosing
low investment:

1
(VH
2

+ K)

cH

1
(VL
2

+ K)

cL ; she chooses low investment

otherwise. Her decision is independent of the level of cancelation payment, and is
determined by the value resulting from her investment. High investment is made when
VH

VL + 2(cH

cL ), and low investment is made otherwise. When high-investment

contract with renegotiation dominates low-investment contract with renegotiation,
the agent enters if the value of his outside option is sufficiently low:
1
⌘  (VH + K)
2

cH ,

and she stays out otherwise. She enters a low-investment contract if ⌘  12 (VL + K)
cL , she stays out otherwise.
When 2↵cH

VH < 2↵cL VL and 2↵cL VL > K

2↵cH

VH , then according to

(2.1) the principal accepts high-investment contracts. She renegotiates low investment
contracts since her payo↵ from doing so exceeds the payo↵ from accepting them:
1
[V
2 L

K] > VL

↵cL . Conditional on entering the contract, the agent chooses eH if

the fixed cancellation payment is sufficiently low:
K  2(↵

1)cH + 2cL

VL .

(7)

Since the principal’s decision to accept only high-investment contracts is determined
by 2↵cL
2↵cL

VL > K

2↵cH

VH , and the upper bound in (7) 2(↵

1)cH + 2cL

VL >

VL , then condition (7) is non-binding. Conditional on entering the contract,

exerting eH is always privately optimal. The agent enters the contract if ⌘  (↵ 1)cH .
Otherwise, she prefers to stay out.
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Instructions
Thank you for participating in this experiment on decision-making behavior. You will
be paid for your participation in cash at the end of the experiment. Your earnings for
today’s experiment will depend partly on your decisions and partly on the decisions
of the player with whom you are matched.
It is important that you strictly follow the rules of this experiment. If you disobey
the rules, you will be asked to leave the experiment. If you have a question at any
time during the experiment, please raise your hand and a monitor will come over to
your desk and answer it in private.
Description of the task
You will be participating in a simple game. The game requires 2 players, one of
whom will be called Player 1 and the other Player 2. Prior to the start of the session,
you will be randomly assigned the role of either Player 1 or Player 2 and will remain
in this role throughout the experiment.
The experiment consists of 10 games. In each game you are matched with a
di↵erent player of the opposite type. That is, if you are Player 1 you will be matched
with a di↵erent Player 2 for each subsequent game. Importantly, you will not know
the identity of the players with whom you will be matched, nor will the person with
whom you are matched know your identity.
Below is a pictorial representation of the game.
Player 1 will move first by selecting one of three branches

Branch J, Branch T,

or Branch N. If Player 1 selects Branch N, the game will end. If either Branch J or
Branch T is selected, Player 2 will select one of two branches – Branch A or Branch
B. Once Player 2 has made this decision, the game will end.
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The terminal brackets contain the payo↵ information. The game will end at one
of the five terminal brackets. The top number in each bracket gives the payo↵ in $’s
for Player 1. The bottom number in each bracket gives the payo↵ in $’s for Player 2.
Procedure for Playing the Game
Player 1 will move first by selecting one of three branches – Branch J, Branch
T, or Branch N. The procedure for playing the game that follows from each of these
branches is detailed below.
Branch J:
If Player 1 selects Branch J , Player 2 will select one of two branches – Branch
A or Branch B. Once Player 2 selects a branch, payo↵s are realized as follows:
If Player 2 selects Branch A:
• Player 1 receives a payo↵ of J1A
• Player 2 receives a payo↵ of J2A
If Player 2 selects Branch B:
• Player 1 receives a payo↵ of J1B
• Player 2 receives a payo↵ of J2B
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This will be the end of the game.
Branch T:
If Player 1 selects Branch T , Player 2 will select one of two branches – Branch
A or Branch B. Once Player 2 selects a branch, payo↵s are realized as follows:
If Player 2 selects Branch A:
• Player 1 receives a payo↵ of T1A
• Player 2 receives a payo↵ of T2A
If Player 2 selects Branch B:
• Player 1 receives a payo↵ of T1B
• Player 2 receives a payo↵ of T2B
This will be the end of the game.
Branch N:
If Player 1 selects Branch N , the game will end and payo↵s are realized as
follows:
• Player 1 receives a payo↵ of N1
• Player 2 receives a payo↵ of N2
This will be the end of the game.
Final Payo↵s
You will only be paid your earnings for one of the ten games you will play during
todayss session. After all ten games have been completed, we will randomly select
one of the games by selecting an index card that is numbered from 1 to 10. The
number on the card which is selected will determine which game will determine your
earnings for today’s session.
Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will end up a↵ecting
your earnings. You will not know in advance which decision will hold, but each
decision has an equal chance of being selected.
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